Politics of Health Legislation: An Economic Perspective ANNOTATION
The book contains no figures.
FROM THE CRITICS
Nancy Milio
This readable, updated, sophisticated, and supplemented book on policymaking presents and clearly illustrates an analytic (i.e., economic or self-interest) paradigm to explain the adoption of an array of health-related legislation, including approaches to healthcare reform up to 1996. The purpose is to use an economic interpretation -- rather than charity or public interest explanations -- to account for legislative outcomes in the health field for the nontechnical reader. The book is intended for a diverse audience interested in a broad range of health-related legislation, including environmental and redistributive policy, as well as health services and research. This could include students, faculty, and practitioners in policy and administration. This well-laid-out text contains an introductory overview and, in each chapter, a brief outline, study questions, and notes, which facilitate focused reading. It also has a detailed index, but no bibliography or figures. This is a highly readable, useful, and needed book for analysts and practitioners in health-related fields who are interested in policy development. The analytic approach is well-illustrated and generalizable to emerging areas of policy. A few diagrams would have further illuminated the text.
Doody Review Services
Reviewer: Nancy Milio, PhD, FAAN, FAPHA (University of North Carolina Chapel Hill School of Public Health)Description: This readable, updated, sophisticated, and supplemented book on policymaking presents and clearly illustrates an analytic (i.e., economic or self-interest) paradigm to explain the adoption of an array of health-related legislation, including approaches to healthcare reform up to 1996. Purpose: The purpose is to use an economic interpretation:rather than charity or public interest explanations:to account for legislative outcomes in the health field for the nontechnical reader. Audience: The book is intended for a diverse audience interested in a broad range of health-related legislation, including environmental and redistributive policy, as well as health services and research. This could include students, faculty, and practitioners in policy and administration. Features: This well-laid-out text contains an introductory overview and, in each chapter, a brief outline, study questions, and notes, which facilitate focused reading. It also has a detailed index, but no bibliography or figures. Assessment: This is a highly readable, useful, and needed book for analysts and practitioners in health-related fields who are interested in policy development. The analytic approach is well-illustrated and generalizable to emerging areas of policy. A few diagrams would have further illuminated the text.
Booknews
Feldstein (health care management, University of California, Irvine) applies economic theory to produce explanations of legislative outcomes in the area of healthcare. Beginning with an economic version of the interest group theory of government, the book gauges the relative success of health associations, considers the demand for legislation, and identifies the reasons for deregulation. It describes the emergence of market competition, considers the control of externalities, and discusses redistributive programs, Medicare, and health care reform. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)
Booknews
Feldstein (health care management, UC-Irvine) theorizes that health legislation arises from individuals, groups, and legislators acting in their own economic self-interest. He examines various types of legislation, including producer legislation, government intervention, and redistributive legislation. This second edition contains updated material and new sections on proposed Medicare and Medicaid changes, and President Clinton's healthcare reform proposal. For students in health policy and economics. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)
RATING
3 Stars from Doody
ACCREDITATION
Feldstein, Paul J. (UC Irvine)