Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order FROM THE PUBLISHER
"At a time when relations between the United States and Europe are at their lowest ebb since World War II, this brief but cogent book is essential reading. Robert Kagan, a leading scholar of American foreign policy, forces both sides to see themselves through the eyes of the other. Europe, he argues, has moved beyond power into a self-contained world of laws, rules, and negotiation, while American operates in a "Hobbesian" world in which rules and laws are unreliable and military force is often necessary." Tracing how this state of affairs came into being over the past fifty years and exploring its ramifications for the future, Kagan reveals the shape of the new transatlantic relationship.
SYNOPSIS
"The task," pronounces neoconservative columnist Kagan in his apologia for empire, "for both Europeans and Americans, is to readjust to the new reality of American hegemony." Expanded from an article that appeared in Policy Review, this book-length essay examines the different perspectives Americans and Europeans have on international relations, arguing that European expectations of peace and a system of laws are only possible because of the naked use of American power. While serving as a guarantor of the European paradise, Kagan says, the United States cannot enter it, serving instead as a lonely guardian walking the walls of paradise. Annotation ©2003 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR
FROM THE CRITICS
The New York Times
A veteran of four years in the State Department, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the author of several books and articles, Kagan demonstrates a confidence and authority that demand serious attention. To disagree with his theses is not to argue against the importance of his essay. On the contrary, generating an intelligent and focused debate is a major function of such works. The true measure of Kagan's small book is that it is hard to imagine any future serious discussion of trans-Atlantic relations or America's role in the world without reference to it. — Serge Schmemann
Foreign Affairs
A book version of the essay that sparked a great debate on both sides of the Atlantic in 2002. In this tour de force, Kagan argues that today's conflict between the United States and Europe is not simply a result of passing policy disputes or the Bush administration's foreign policy style. Rather, it reflects a more profound estrangement rooted in American power and European weakness. The old Atlantic partners live today on different planets. America's preeminent global position has thrust it into a Hobbesian world of lurking threats and made it more willing to use force, whereas Europe seeks peace through law and diplomacy. Kagan is best in describing Europe's postwar project of taming the dangers and instabilities of power politics in a democratic, Kantian zone of peace. Thanks partly to the U.S. security guarantee, Europeans have devised a political order in which power is subdued and the use of force banished. Yet Europe has also made itself weak, Kagan charges, as its nations remain unable to confront the anarchical dangers of the wider world. Kagan argues that America's realpolitik view is not only a feature of Republican administrations but a deeper expression of American power (after all, Bill Clinton was willing to bomb Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sudan). The result is a growing divergence in strategic views and eroding solidarity.
Kagan's characterization of a postmodern Europe, however, is too German-centered; he ignores the fact that the United Kingdom and France retain great-power identities and a willingness to use military force. His reading of the United States is also debatable. The United States has been the preeminent global power since World War II, yet it has oftenpursued its national interest through multilateral institutions and security partnerships. Pace Kagan, Europe and the United States might disagree on the nature of threats outside the West — as they have in the past — but their own relationship remains embedded in an Atlantic security community.
Library Journal
This slim work by Kagan (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) ought to be required reading within the Bush administration as it attempts to patch together a multinational coalition to unseat Saddam Hussein. In a beefed-up version of his seminal 2002 article in Policy Review, Kagan argues that the United States and Europe no longer inhabit the same universe where power politics is concerned. Power, then, lies at the heart of the transatlantic culture war. Americans have it-making them a target and priming them to use it to address foreign threats. Europeans don't have it, and, judging by their trifling defense budgets, don't want it. Operating from a "psychology of weakness," says Kagan, Europeans place their faith in diplomacy, international law, and international institutions-both to come to grips with the Saddams of the world and to rein in what they see as the excesses of the world's remaining superpower. It behooves American officials to try to bridge this gap in perspectives. This brilliant and controversial work belongs in all library collections.-James R. Holmes, Univ. of Georgia Ctr. for International Trade & Security, Athens Copyright 2003 Reed Business Information.
Kirkus Reviews
Former diplomat and current conservative think-tanker Kagan (A Twilight Struggle: American Power and Nicaragua, 1996) rehashes an argument he originally offered in 2001 in 'Policy Review'. That argument goes like this: During the Cold War, the developed world fell into two camps, one dominated by the US, the other by the Soviet Union. The former had need "to preserve and demonstrate the existence of a cohesive ﾽWest,ﾽ " and so political divisions between, say, Germany and the US tended to be muted, at least on an official level. Though it begs for a united front of defense, todayﾽs common enemy--Islamic fundamentalism--does not demand the same coherence, which allows Europe to turn away from superpower big-stick formulas, to move "beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation." The US, conversely, is settling into its role as the worldﾽs sole superpower, able to accomplish at least some of its tasks in the "anarchic Hobbesian" world by virtue of its military might. Europe, of course, benefits from this situation, even while clucking its tongue and attempting to "control the behemoth by appealing to its conscience," which Kagan considers to be a pretty good strategy that usually works. The upshot? Interpretations may vary, but Kagan offers a genteel solution for both sides: Europe should let us do what we must to keep the peace, recognizing that "we have only just entered a long era of American hegemony." And America shouldnﾽt try to bully Europe into accepting the unpalatable, and perhaps even listen to our putative allies from time to time. Though heﾽs capable of concocting a memorable sound bite, Kagan develops his nuancedargument with an appreciation for why Europeans are not now lining up alongside us to give Saddam a good thrashing. Good reading for policy wonks who missed the original article, of a piece with recent arguments for the virtues of American imperialism.
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