The Conflict over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did

The Journal of Military History, April 2002
The most authoritative look yet at what went on, and why, in this significant and unusual war.


Book Description
This report examines the reasons Slobodan Milosevic, the then president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, decided on June 3, 1999, to accept NATO's conditions for terminating the conflict over Kosovo. Drawing in part upon the testimony of Milosevic and other senior Serb and foreign officials who directly interacted with Milosevic, the report analyzes (1) the assumptions and other calculations that underlay Milosevic's initial decision to defy NATO's demands with regard to Kosovo, and (2) the political, economic, and military developments and pressures, and the resulting expectations and concerns that most importantly influenced his subsequent decision to come to terms. While several interrelated factors, including Moscow's eventual endorsement of NATO's terms, helped shape Milosevic's decision to yield, it was the cumulative effect of NATO air power that proved most decisive. The allied bombing of Serbia's infrastructure targets, as it intensified, stimulated a growing interest among both the Servian public and Belgrade officials to end the conflict. Milosevic's belief that the bombing that would follow a rejection of NATO's June 2 peace terms would be massively destructive and threatening to his continued rule made a settlement seem imperative. Also examined are some implications for future U.S. and allied military capabilities and operations.


Download Description
This report examines the reasons Slobodan Milosevic, the then president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, decided on June 3, 1999, to accept NATO's conditions for terminating the conflict over Kosovo. Drawing in part upon the testimony of Milosevic and other senior Serb and foreign officials who directly interacted with Milosevic, the report analyzes (1) the assumptions and other calculations that underlay Milosevic's initial decision to defy NATO's demands with regard to Kosovo, and (2) the political, economic, and military developments and pressures, and the resulting expectations and concerns that most importantly influenced his subsequent decision to come to terms. While several interrelated factors, including Moscow's eventual endorsement of NATO's terms, helped shape Milosevic's decision to yield, it was the cumulative effect of NATO air power that proved most decisive. The allied bombing of Serbia's infrastructure targets, as it intensified, stimulated a growing interest among both the Servian public and Belgrade officials to end the conflict. Milosevic's belief that the bombing that would follow a rejection of NATO's June 2 peace terms would be massively destructive and threatening to his continued rule made a settlement seem imperative. Also examined are some implications for future U.S. and allied military capabilities and operations.


From the Publisher
Since the end of the Cold War a decade ago, the armed forces of theUnited States have been committed to protracted, large-scale com-batoperations only twice: Operation Desert Storm in 1991 andOperation Allied Force in 1999. In both conflicts, U.S. and allied airoperations played a key role in securing allied war aims with minimalfriendly casualties. Because U.S. military and civilian leaders willalso want to conclude future conflicts at minimal cost, it is importantthat they understand the circumstances and operational effects thatwere instrumental in producing the successful outcomes of the past.This book examines the reasons Slobodan Milosevic decided on June3, 1999, to accept NATO's conditions for terminating the conflict overKosovo. Among other issues, the study analyzes (1) the assumptionsand other calculations that underlay Milosevic's initial decision todefy NATO's demands with regard to Kosovo, and (2) the political,economic, and military developments and pressures and theresulting expectations and concerns that most heavily influenced hissubsequent decision to come to terms. Because bombing was theprimary instrument used by the NATO allies, particular attention isnecessarily given to identifying and assessing its different coerciveeffects on the Serb population and leadership.The book should be of interest to national security officials, militarycommanders, and other persons responsible for the development ofU.S. military capabilities, the planning and conduct of U.S. militaryoperations, and the formulation of strategies for bringing U.S. powerto bear in the service of U.S. national interests.The research, which was part of a larger RAND Project AIR FORCEstudy of Operation Allied Force, was conducted within the Strategyand Doctrine Program of Project AIR FORCE and was sponsored bythe Commander, United States Air Forces in Europe, and theDirector of Strategic Planning, Headquarters, United States Air Force.Research was completed in March 2001. Comments are welcomeand may be addressed either to the author or to the Strategy andDoctrine Program director, Edward R. Harshberger.PROJECT AIR FORCEProject AIR FORCE, a division of RAND, is the Air Force federallyfunded research and development center (FFRDC) for studies andanalysis. It provides the Air Force with independent analyses of pol-icyalternatives affecting the development, employment, combatreadiness, and support of current and future aerospace forces.Research is carried out in four programs: Aerospace ForceDevelopment; Manpower, Personnel, and Training; ResourceManagement; and Strategy and Doctrine.


About the Author
STEPHEN T. HOSMER (Ph.D., International Relations, Yale University) is a senior staff member at RAND. His research focus includes the psychological dimensions of war, the efficacy of operations aimed at removing enemy leaders, and the political-military conditions that promote conflict termination.


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This report examines the reasons Slobodan Milosevic, the then president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, decided on June 3, 1999, to accept NATO's conditions for terminating the conflict over Kosovo. Drawing in part upon the testimony of Milosevic and other senior Serb and foreign officials who directly interacted with Milosevic, the report analyzes (1) the assumptions and other calculations that underlay Milosevic's initial decision to defy NATO's demands with regard to Kosovo, and (2) the political, economic, and military developments and pressures, and the resulting expectations and concerns that most importantly influenced his subsequent decision to come to terms. While several interrelated factors, including Moscow's eventual endorsement of NATO's terms, helped shape Milosevic's decision to yield, it was the cumulative effect of NATO air power that proved most decisive. The allied bombing of Serbia's infrastructure targets, as it intensified, stimulated a growing interest among both the Servian public and Belgrade officials to end the conflict. Milosevic's belief that the bombing that would follow a rejection of NATO's June 2 peace terms would be massively destructive and threatening to his continued rule made a settlement seem imperative. Also examined are some implications for future U.S. and allied military capabilities and operations.


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