Biological Weapons: From the Invention of State-Sponsored Programs to Contemporary Bioterrorism

From Publishers Weekly
Having published a similarly squared-away study of the 1979 anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk, Russia, in 1999, MIT security studies fellow Guillemin returns with a compact and balanced history of biological weaponry, beginning with the British, American and Japanese programs that predate WWII. British and American programs continued through much of the Cold War; seeking strategic effectiveness but succeeding only indifferently, they were phased out. But the Soviet programs flourished and, when abolished in the 1990s, they left behind much of the resources in expertise and in some cases actual stockpiles now available to terrorists. Not that bioterrorism is necessarily the menace that media sensationalism makes it out to be, provided that responsible decisions influenced by common sense are made to prepare for it. Guillemin outlines such common sense programs in valuable detail, although she appears to underestimate the extent to which some of them will require international controls over basic scientific research and the amount of resistance this could meet from governments and scientists. Admirably free of finger-pointing, shrillness and Luddite tendencies, the book ranks high as a historical introduction to the subject and a handbook on contemporary remedies; in the latter role, it is superior to Daniel Barenblatt's A Plague Upon Humanity. Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.


Review
"Guillemin's account of biological weapons is lucid and concise, providing an excellent guide through the evidence on the past and issues for the future." -- Lawrence D. Freedman, Foreign Affairs


Review
"Biological weapons have a justly deserved reputation as barbaric weapons that should never be used. Guillemin is one of our leading authorities on the history of these terrible weapons, and what a history it is: secret research programs undertaken without public knowledge or debate; unethical experiments on prisoners-of-war, conscientious objectors, and unwitting users of subways and airports; and meticulously calculated plans to kill millions. Guillemin has given us, for the first time, a book that pulls together everything we know about biological warfare research in the U.S., the Soviet Union, Europe and Canada. Writing straightforwardly, without cheap sensationalism or bias, she gives a lucid account of the history of these programs and of the dangers now confront us if they fall into the hands of terrorists." -- Hugh Gusterson, author of "People of the Bomb" and Associate Professor of Anthropology and Science Studies, MIT


Book Description
A major goal of this book is to help readers understand the relevance of the historical restraints placed on the use of biological weapons for today's world. The last three chapters serve as an excellent introduction to the problems biological weapons pose for contemporary policymakers and public officials, particularly in the United States. How can we best deter the use of such weapons? What are the resulting policies of the Department of Homeland Security? How can we constrain proliferation? Jeanne Guillemin wisely points out that these are vitally important questions for all Americans to consider and investigate. Public awareness through education can help calm fears in today's tension-filled climate and prepare the nation for preventive action against the possibility of an attack.


About the Author
Jeanne Guillemin is professor of sociology at Boston College and senior fellow in the Security Studies Program at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. She is the author of Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak.


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Chilling history of biological and chemical weaponry from WWI to the present. Rather than preaching a passionate sermon against evil, Guillemin (Sociology/Boston College; Security Studies Program/MIT; Anthrax, 1999) coolly marshals her facts to provide a chronology of names, dates, experiments, mistakes and sometimes deliberate use of biowarfare by major powers. She also covers the concomitant international moves toward control: the Geneva Protocol, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, and sundry national laws and international agreements aimed at destroying stockpiles and empowering international inspections. New to some readers will be details about Japan's use of plague to decimate civilian populations in Manchuria during the 1930s, Russian outbreaks of smallpox and inhalational anthrax in towns near bioweapons factories, and major British and French biowarfare programs based on fears that Hitler would launch such assaults. (Surprisingly, those fears were unfounded.) Most disturbing of all is the story of America's ventures into bioweaponry. The post-WWII buildup of anthrax, smallpox, tularemia, hemorrhagic fevers, cholera, botulinum toxin, and other biological agents went on until Nixon's 1969 renunciation of bioweapons, which opened an era of dismantling programs. But after the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the US as sole superpower, America started withdrawing from multilateral agreements. Growing concerns about bioterrorism led to public-health preparedness programs and biodefense research. The buildup grew after 9/ll-and so did secrecy, communication controls and failures, a lack of accountability, a growing distrust of the government bythe public and of the US by the world: exactly the ingredients that can fuel bioterrorism. Guillemin advocates transparency, improving international relations to increase mutual trust, and freely shared information. The author doesn't quite tell us to abandon all hope, but it's certainly not reassuring to read how easily governments move from defensive programs against bioweapons to offensive use and abuse. Author tour


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