The Blitzkrieg Myth: How Hitler and the Allies Misread the Strategic Realities of World War II

From Publishers Weekly
In this revisionist history, Mosier (Myth of the Great War) attempts to debunk the conventional understanding of European theater warfare during World War II by declaring that Blitzkrieg-style assaults occurred less often and were less effective than commonly believed. Mosier's reassessment of the military importance of Blitzkrieg-where an army rapidly breaks through its enemy's defenses with a coordinated barrage of ground and air artillery-is certainly worthwhile, and the English professor and amateur military historian presents his case with breezy confidence. But despite a detailed bibliography and notes for each chapter, noticeable omissions undercut Mosier's argument. In the chapter on the fall of France, for example, he does not mention French officer and historian Marc Bloch's classic, firsthand account and analysis Strange Defeat. Mosier also lifts lesser-known commanders, like English general Montgomery, to the exalted heights of Rommel, Patton and Eisenhower (he extols Montgomery as a master of conventional tactics that he considers generally more effective than Blitzkrieg). Although an admirable project, this revision demands that the reader suppose a new, half-baked "historical truth" in lieu of much of the previous literature on Blitzkrieg warfare and WWII. No doubt this will spark plenty of controversy. 10 b&w photos and 11 maps. Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.


Book Description

Hitler, Rommel, von Manstein, Montgomery, and Patton were all equally seduced by the idea of breakthrough, or blitzkrieg. The blitzkrieg myth was based on the belief that the new technology of the airplane and the tank would result in rapid and massive advances on the battlefield. The demoralization of the enemy by intensive bombing would cause vast destruction, and lead to surrender in a matter of weeks.

Author and military historian John Mosier shows how the Polish campaign in the autumn of 1939 and the fall of France in the spring of 1940 were not blitzkrieg victories. He also reinterprets Rommel's North African campaigns, D-day, the Normandy campaign, and Hitler's last desperate breakthrough effort to Antwerp in the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944, among others. All these actions saw the clash of breakthrough theories with the realities of conventional military tactics.

FROM THE PUBLISHER

The great myth of the First World War was that defense was all-powerful. In the interwar years, a new myth appeared - that the new technology of the airplane and the tank would result in rapid and massive breakthroughs on the battlefield, with the enemy being destroyed in weeks.

John Mosier shows how Hitler, Rommel, von Manstein, Montgomery, and Patton were all equally seduced by the breakthrough myth, or blitzkrieg, as the decisive way to victory. He shows how the Polish campaign in the autumn of 1939 and the fall of France in the spring of 1940 were not blitzkrieg victories. He also reinterprets Rommel's North African campaigns, D day, the Normandy campaign, and Hitler's last desperate breakthrough effort to Antwerp in the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944, among others. All these actions saw the clash of breakthrough theories with the realities of conventional military tactics.

SYNOPSIS

All accounts of the Second World War accept key assumptions of mistaken theories of warfare first formulated in the 1920s, argues Mosier (English, Loyola U.). The outcome of the war had less to do with these theories of Blitzkrieg and airpower than with traditional factors of politics and strategy. He describes the genesis of the two theories, both based on the concept of breakthrough, and explains why they were incorrect. He then looks at how the French and the Germans prepared for war, suggesting that they were both based more on building fortifications than on tanks and planes and that they were more similar than is acknowledged. The remaining bulk of the work describes the major campaigns in Western Europe in light of this realignment of assumptions. Annotation ©2004 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

FROM THE CRITICS

The Washington Post

Mosier's reassessment of the war and how it was won marshals some strong evidence and is solidly argued. And it will no doubt have historians up in arms for years to come. — Victorino Matus

Library Journal